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Environmental Violations, Legal Penalties, and Reputation Costs
Jonathan M. Karpoff, John R. Lott, Jr., and Graeme Rankine1
Abstract
This paper examines the sizes and determinants of fines, damage awards,
remediation costs, and market value losses imposed on companies that violate
environmental laws. We find that legal penalties are not significantly related to firm
size, indicating no support for views that large companies face unusually small legal
penalties. In fact, we can explain very little of the cross-sectional variation in legal
penalties, lending support to arguments that such penalties are highly variable and
unpredictable. On average, firms violating environmental laws suffer statistically
significant losses in the market value of firm equity. The losses are of similar magnitude
to the legal penalties imposed, indicating that legal penalties, and not reputational
losses, are most important in disciplining and deterring environmental violations.
I. Introduction
Few policy issues raise as much controversy as do those relating to the
environment. Two related controversies characterize the debate over the optimal
structure of penalties for companies that violate environmental regulations. The first is
over the significance, bias, and predictability of legal penalties. Advocates of stiffer
penalties argue that firms do not suffer large enough penalties to encourage compliance
with environmental regulations, and that large firms in particular are punished lightly.
Opponents of stiffer penalties argue that many environmental violations wrongfully
have been criminalized, and that legal penalties are arbitrary and unpredictable. The
second controversy is over the cost to defendant companies of allegations or charges of
environmental violations. In particular, do companies experience significant losses in
market value, and do they experience reputational losses?
In this paper we examine these controversies by providing evidence about the
size and predictability of legal penalties, the share value effects of news about
environmental violations, and the reputational costs of such violations. Using data from
283 environmental violations by publicly traded companies from 1980 through 1991, we
find that legal penalties frequently are substantial. The mean fine or damage award in
our sample is $9.43 million (the median is $600,000), and the average forced compliance
or remediation cost is $59.97 million (the median is $8 million). There is no robust
1
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evidence that legal penalties are related to firm size, or, for that matter, the
characteristics of the violation, the party bringing the action, or the type of action
brought. These results are consistent with arguments that legal penalties are
idiosyncratic and difficult to predict.
We find that allegations or charges that a firm violated environmental regulations
correspond to economically meaningful and statistically significant losses in the firm’s
share value. Initial press announcements containing allegations of a violation are
associated with an average abnormal stock return of -1.58%. When the initial
announcement indicates that the firm has been charged with, or sued for, a violation,
the average abnormal stock return is -1.92%.
While these share value losses are significant, on average they are not larger than
the legal penalties imposed. This indicates that the share value losses tend to reflect the
cost of legal penalties. Reputational penalties, in contrast, appear to be negligible. This
result is consistent with arguments that legal penalties, and not market-induced
penalties, are the primary deterrent to environmental violations.
Our investigation is related to a growing body of research on the monitoring and
enforcement of environmental policy.2 Several researchers examine the share value
impacts of unfavorable environmental news, such as oil or chemical spills.3 Others
examine the regulatory fines imposed for single types of environmental discharges.
Cohen (1987), for example, finds that monetary penalties imposed by the U.S. Coast
Guard for oil spills increase when the spill involves personnel error or maintenance
problems, but decrease with natural causes—suggesting that the Coast Guard uses a
negligence standard and not a strict liability standard in assessing penalties. Hamilton
(1996) finds that EPA administrative fines for hazardous waste violators are lower when
the EPA follows its formal rules rather than negotiating an informal settlement,
suggesting that negotiations tend to occur after more costly violations. Our paper
differs from this work by examining the determinants of the total legal penalties—
including fines, damage awards, compliance, and cleanup costs—for firms committing a
wide variety of environmental violations.4 Also, by relating the total penalty to the size
of the market value loss, we provide the first empirical measures of the sizes of any
reputational costs that arise from environmental violations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the two primary
controversies regarding the optimal penalties for environmental violations, and
summarizes the issues we seek to address empirically. Section III describes the data and
2
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reports on the legal penalties for environmental violations. Section IV reports on the
sizes and determinants of share value losses for firms investigated or charged with
violations, and section V investigates the importance of reputational penalties. Section
VI concludes the paper.
II. Controversies about Environmental Penalties
A. The Legal Penalties Controversy
Environmental offenses in the United States historically have been prosecuted as
civil matters or under general criminal statutes.5 Environmental regulations, and the use
of criminal sanctions to enforce them, have appeared only recently. Criminal sanctions
were included in the major environmental laws passed in the 1970’s, including 1972
amendments to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, the Safe
Drinking Water Act of 1974, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, and
the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976. In 1981, the EPA established its Office of
Criminal Enforcement and the Department of Justice established its Environmental
Crimes Unit, both to investigate and prosecute criminal violations of environmental
law. In subsequent years, Congress went further by reclassifying some misdemeanors
as felonies.6
As a result of these actions, most environmental regulatory violations can be
prosecuted as criminal violations. Cohen (1992) reports that the number of new federal
criminal prosecutions of environmental laws increased to more than 100 per year by the
late 1980’s. Lazarus (1994) reports that between 1983 and 1993, the Department of
Justice recorded 911 criminal indictments against individuals and corporations, with 686
guilty pleas or convictions. During this time period, $212,408,903 in criminal penalties
were assessed, and more than 388 years of imprisonment were imposed on individuals.
The increasing criminalization of environmental violations is both a result and a
cause of considerable controversy. Administrative fines for environmental violations are
low—for example, averaging $10,181 in 1995 (see Lear 1998)—prompting arguments to
increase legal penalties. Although criminal sanctions are now frequently imposed,
proponents of higher penalties argue that they should be used even more. In 1992, for
example, the Congressional Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House
Committee on Energy and Commerce considered accusations that incompetence and
5
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malfeasance at the Department of Justice allow defendants to avoid significant penalties
for environmental violations. The committee chairman, Rep. John Dingell, charged that
environmental laws are enforced selectively, and that “large and powerful
corporations” in particular receive preferential treatment and face small penalties.7 As
an example of preferential treatment, Siegel (1993) describes the small penalties
eventually imposed on Rockwell International for its participation in the environmental
degradation of the area surrounding the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons facility.
The counter-argument holds that legal penalties should be used more selectively.
Lazarus (1994), for example, argues that criminal sanctions have been applied too
widely and unevenly to activities that do not merit them. As a result, the prosecution of
environmental violations is unpredictable, even arbitrary. Coffee (1991) notes that the
increased use of criminal penalties for environmental violations helps blur the
distinction between crimes and torts. Cohen (1992) argues that overdeterrence is socially
costly, as firms undertake excessive measures to avoid environmental violations.
The debate over the penalty levels, particularly the use of criminal sanctions, is
complicated by the nature of many environmental violations. Unlike street crimes,
which have negligible social value, most environmental violations arise from socially
productive activities. Furthermore, most environmental violations involve matters of
risky rather than certain outcomes. There is no threshold below which murder is
acceptable, for example, whereas most types of pollution are not unlawful per se.
Because of such complexities, the penalties imposed for environmental violations
depend to an unusually large extent on the discretion of prosecutors, courts, and juries.8
Disagreement over the appropriate legal penalties for environmental violations has
impeded the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s efforts to adopt sentencing guidelines for
environmental crimes. The Commission’s sentencing guidelines for crimes by
organizations became law on November 1, 1991. The Commission specifically excluded
environmental violations from these guidelines, however, intending to adopt
environmental guidelines at a later date. Since then, the Commission has considered,
but failed to adopt, several proposals for such guidelines.
Virtually all of the proposals the Commission has considered would assign higher
fines for environmental crimes than for other business crimes covered by the existing
guidelines. A proposal put forth in 1994 by the Commission’s Advisory Working
Group, for example, would impose higher fines and limit the extent to which mitigating
circumstances or compliance programs could be used to reduce the fines (see Fiorelli
and Rooney (1995)). Although the proposal was not adopted, Fiorelli and Rooney (1995)
7
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argue that its relatively harsh provisions are likely to characterize the Commission’s
ultimate environmental guidelines.
B. The Reputational Cost Controversy
The Commission’s decision to adopt separate environmental sentencing guidelines
reflects a belief that environmental violations differ fundamentally from other business
crimes. One way that environmental violations differ is that they may involve fewer
reputational costs. Evidence indicates that frauds, product recalls, false advertising, and
punitive damage lawsuits all impose reputational penalties on the perpetrating firms.9
Karpoff and Lott (1993) find that most of the penalties suffered by firms committing
private frauds—over 90%—reflects lost reputation. Only a small portion of the financial
penalties imposed on such firms is due to criminal penalties and other court-imposed
costs.
As Klein and Leffler (1981) and Lott (1996) argue, reputation disciplines certain
types of crime because market transactions internalize their costs. Companies that
defraud customers, for example, lose sales. Those that cheat employees or other
suppliers face higher input costs or lost trade credit. The cost of the illegal activity is
internalized because the cheating firm loses at least some of the gains that accrue from
repeat business with consumers, employees, or suppliers.10
Much of the controversy over the size of legal penalties for environmental
violations arises from disagreement about the extent to which reputation and private
incentives discipline environmental crimes. Porter and Van der Linde (1995), for
example, argue that environmental insensitivity directly increases a firm’s cost of
business. Pargal and Wheeler (1996), Arora and Cason (1996), and Konar and Cohen
(1998) claim that community pressure and informal sanctions can penalize
environmental violations. As an example, a waste incinerating firm that does not
comply with environmental regulations may incur higher future costs when locating its
operations. Cohen (1992) argues that evidence that a firm falsified documents or
discharged wastes might adversely affect customers’ perceptions about the safety or
quality of the firm’s products. The firm’s customers, employees, or suppliers also can be
motivated by environmental concern to change their reservation prices in doing
business with the firm. Environmentally costly activities that attract unfavorable
attention could then lower demand for the firm’s products (e.g., through consumer
boycotts), or increase the firm’s costs. According to each of these arguments, market-
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imposed sanctions—what we label reputational costs—impose significant penalties on
firms that violate environmental regulations.11
A competing view, however, holds that reputation plays only a small role in
disciplining environmental crimes. This view is implicit in the U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s efforts to impose higher penalties for environmental violations than for
other illegal activities. Optimal penalty theory (e.g., as in Becker (1968)) requires that the
expected total penalty for a crime—including both legal and reputational penalties—is
equal to the total social cost of the crime. Therefore, from an optimal penalty
framework, the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s efforts make sense only if environmental
reputational penalties are relatively small.
The Commission’s (implicit) view is quite plausible. Environmentally harmful
activities typically impose costs on parties other than those with whom the firm does
business. The parties who are damaged therefore cannot impose costs on the firm by,
for example, refusing to buy its products. The parties with whom the firm does
business—customers and suppliers, for example—typically have small direct incentive
to impose costs on an ecologically insensitive firm. As an example, downstream
fishermen are damaged if an electroplating company dumps toxic chemicals into a
municipal storm sewer. The firm’s customers, however, have no direct incentive to
lower their demands for the firm’s products if the dumping does not affect the quality
of those products.
C. Empirical Issues We Address
The controversies over the legal penalties for environmental violations, and the
possible importance of reputational penalties, raise the following questions:
1.

2.
3.
4.

Are the total legal penalties for environmental violations consequential?
How large are the fines, damage awards, compliance costs, and cleanup
costs paid by firms?
Are legal penalties for environmental violations predictable? That is, are they
systematically associated with the type or cost of the violation?
Do violations that are prosecuted as criminal cases receive higher legal
penalties than violations prosecuted as civil cases?
Controlling for characteristics of the violation, are legal penalties
systematically related to firm size? In particular, do large firms receive lower
penalties?
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5.
6.

Do firms discovered to have violated environmental regulations experience
significant losses in market value?
Do firms that violate environmental regulations have reputational losses?
That is, do firms lose market value over and above the costs of any legal
sanctions?
III. Data

To provide answers to these questions, we examine 283 cases in which publicly
traded firms were investigated, accused, or settled charges of environmental violations
from 1980 through 1991. The sample is obtained from a search of The Wall Street Journal
Index under its “Environment” and “Environmental Crime” listings. To be included in
the sample, the defendant firm must have stock returns available on the 1996 CRSP
daily returns file on the day of the earliest Wall Street Journal report of its environmental
violation, plus at least 60 of the preceding 250 trading days.
The sample consists of a wide variety of actions involving different types of
environmental harm and initiated by different regulatory agencies or private parties.
The following examples illustrate typical cases:
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

FMC Corp. was indicted in 1980 for providing false data to the EPA about
the amount of carbon tetrachloride the firm had released in the Kanawha
river in Charleston, West Virginia;
In 1986, a Kerr-McGee Corp. storage tank ruptured and distributed
radioactive uranium hexaflouride gas over a part of eastern Oklahoma,
prompting a civil lawsuit from a group of nearby residents;
In 1990, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection ordered
PPG Industries, Inc. to pay $31.5 million to clean up contamination from a
chromium plant the company had previously operated in the state.

The wide diversity of events in the sample permits us to investigate several
hypotheses regarding the penalties and share value losses incurred by defendant firms.
We classify the sample by the following criteria: (i) the year in which the first news
about the environmental harm was published in the Wall Street Journal; (ii) the type of
lawsuit or regulatory action; (iii) the medium (e.g., air, water) involved; and (iv) the
party bringing the action.
(i) Event year: Panel A of Table 1 reports on the distribution of the sample by year
and the type of action involved. The sample displays no significant time clustering
during the 1980 - 1991 period.
(ii) Type of action: As discussed in Section II, criminal enforcements are at the
center of much controversy over the penalties for environment violations. Relatively
few actual enforcement actions, however, involve criminal charges against firms. In our
7

sample, only 19 cases involve criminal lawsuits. Many more (101) involve civil lawsuits
filed by either private parties or such agencies as the EPA. State and federal regulatory
fines or actions comprise an additional 91 cases, and in 19 cases a firm and regulatory
agency agreed to a court-sanctioned consent order. In 35 additional cases, a firm
recalled a product to avoid environmental sanctions. As an example, in April 1984
American Motors recalled 62,000 of its 1979 model automobiles because of clean air
violations. A final 18 additional cases are classified as “liability assignments.” These
involve situations in which the initial Wall Street Journal press announcement reveals
that the defendant firm had been assigned liability for an environmental charge. For
example, in June 1989, a federal judge ruled that Allied Signal Corp. was liable for the
clean-up costs at two Maryland toxic waste sites.
(iii) Medium involved: Panel B of Table 1 reports the breakdown of the sample by
the type of medium involved. Of the 283 cases in the total sample, 92 involve air
emissions, including violations of the Clean Air Act and its 1990 amendments. Fiftyeight cases involve surface water contamination, including Clean Water Act violations.
Eleven cases involve contamination of drinking water supplies and possible violations
of the Safe Drinking Water Act. An additional 79 cases involve contaminated sites
and/subsurface water contamination, typically involving violations under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 or the Comprehensive Environmental Clean-Up
and Liability Act of 1980. In 13 cases, the violations involve two or more of the
preceding categories, and are classified as multiple media cases. A total of 30 additional
cases are classified as miscellaneous. These include violations under the Toxic
Substances and Control Act, charges of improper storage of hazardous materials, and
several cases in which the medium or specific violation are not discernible from the
available press articles.
(iv) Party bringing the action: Roughly 50% (143) of our cases involve lawsuits or
regulatory actions brought by the EPA. An additional 46 cases involve civil or criminal
lawsuits filed by the Department of Justice. In many of these cases, however, the Justice
Department acted in cooperation with or relied in part upon EPA investigations. In 58
cases, the action was brought by a state or local environmental agency. Environmental
groups, such as the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, brought 7 of the cases, and 29 other
cases were initiated by individuals. This last category includes a number of class-action
lawsuits.
IV. Legal Penalties for Environmental Violations
A. Sizes of Legal Penalties
Firms committing environmental violations face several forms of legal penalties,
including fines, payments to damaged parties, compliance costs, and cleanup expenses.
To examine the sizes of these penalties, we obtained information from the Wall Street
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Journal about the legal penalties imposed for 117 of the 283 cases in the sample. Fines
were imposed or monetary damages awarded in 77 cases, and in 55 cases, the firm
agreed to pay the costs to comply with regulations or remediate prior damage. In 15 of
these cases, a firm paid both a fine and a cleanup cost.
Panel A of Table 2 reports data from the 77 cases in which fines were imposed or
monetary damages awarded to victims. The mean amount awarded is $9.43 million,
although most amounts are substantially smaller than this. The median, for example, is
$600,000. Although the mean payment levels vary by the type of environmental harm,
the differences are not statistically significant. The F-statistic from an analysis of
variance is 1.16, with a p-value of .34. Air emission violations are associated with the
largest mean penalty, $28.10 million. This mean, however, is affected by two settlements
that are not typical among the air emission cases. The first is Union Carbide’s $350
million settlement of claims stemming from the December 3, 1984 leak of poison gas
from the firm’s Bhopal, India pesticide plant, and the second is Monsanto Co.’s $81.9
million settlement of claims arising from the use of Agent Orange during the Vietnam
war. Omitting these unusual cases, the mean assessed penalty for air emission cases is
$8.33 million. (Among the remaining cases, another outlier consists of a 1983 U.S. Justice
Department $112 million penalty against LTV Corp. for failing to install anti-air
pollution equipment required by an earlier consent decree.)
Even excluding these large outliers, the data indicate that defendant companies
typically pay large amounts in fines and damage claims. A more typical air emission
case, for example, is a $990,000 fine paid by International Paper Co. in 1989 for
violations of the Clean Air Act at a Maine paper pulp mill. Typical examples of fines for
surface water violations include a 1982 Mobil Oil Corp. agreement to pay the State of
Alabama a $2 million for illegally discharging drilling fluids into state waters, and a
1989 agreement by Pennwalt Corp. to pay $500,000 to settle U.S. federal criminal
charges arising from a discharge of sodium dichromate into a Washington state
waterway.12
Panel B of Table 1 reports on the 55 cases for which we have information on firms’
estimated costs to comply with regulatory or court-imposed mandates, or to clean up
environmental damage. In general, compliance and cleanup costs are substantially
higher than fines and damage awards. In the 1989 International Paper Co. case cited
above, for example, in addition to its $990,000 fine, the firm also agreed to spend $4.2
million to install air pollution control equipment at its Maine plant. As another example,
in 1981 Ohio Edison was fined $1.55 million for sulphur dioxide and other emissions at

12

The Exxon Valdez oil spill, which occurred in March 1989, resulted in a 1994 jury award of $5.3 billion
in compensatory and punitive damages. We include this case in our sample, but use data on the smaller
monetary damages that were reported in The Wall Street Journal through 1991, which is the end of our
sample period.

9

its coal-burning power plants. At the same time, the firm agreed to spend an estimated
$367 million to comply with Clean Air Act requirements.
Overall, the mean compliance or cleanup cost is $59.97 million, with a median of
$8.0 million. Once again, although the mean values differ according to the type of
medium involved, the differences jointly are not statistically significant.
For 62 additional cases, we obtained information not on the penalties actually
assessed, but rather, on the maximum penalties that potentially could be assessed. For
example, in 1989 a federal court jury awarded $136 million in damages in a mock trial to
class-action plaintiffs who sued National Lead of Ohio Inc. for contamination at its
Fernald, Ohio uranium plant. The purpose of the mock trial was to establish the firm’s
approximate liability should the case go to full trial, and to encourage an out-of-court
settlement. As another example, in 1991 the EPA announced its intention to seek a $4.7
million fine from a unit of Bayer AG for alleged violations of the Toxic Substances
Control Act. In both of these cases, the penalty amounts were not actually awarded or
assessed. We conjecture that the amounts actually assessed subsequently were lower.
Nonetheless, we use this as information about the penalties that potentially could have
been assessed.
Summary data on such potential penalties are reported in Panels C and D of Table
1. The mean levels are substantially higher than those in Panels A and B, reflecting the
speculative nature of these assessments. Overall, the mean potential fine or damage
award is $82.67 million. The differences across media, while substantial, are not
statistically significant.
Prospective compliance and cleanup costs are particularly large. The mean level for
the 11 cases reported in Panel D is $352.77 million. This includes a 1983 case in which
the U.S. Army sued Shell Oil Co. for $1.8 billion to cover actual and projected clean up
costs at a pesticide plant the company operated on Army property. In another extreme
example, in 1990 New Jersey state authorities announced their intentions to seek $2.25
billion from Allied Signal Inc., PPG Industries, and Maxus Energy Co. to clean up toxic
waste from the site of a former chromium refinery.
B. The Determinants of Legal Penalties
The data in Table 2 indicate that firms accused of environmental violations face
potentially large fines, damage awards, or compliance and cleanup costs. Table 3
reports on tests that examine whether the legal penalties are systematically related to
the characteristics of the firm or the nature of the violation. The first column in Table 3
reports coefficients and t-statistics from an ordinary least squares regression in which
the actual fine or damage award is the dependent variable. The regressors include:
•

Firm size, measured as the natural log of the market value of equity ten
calendar days before the initial press announcement;
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•

•

•
•

•

Dummy variables for the party that initiated the action, including state or local
government agencies, environmental groups, and individuals (leaving the
constant term to reflect actions by the EPA or Department of Justice);
Dummy variables for the type of action, including criminal lawsuits, consent
orders, and assignment of cleanup liability (leaving the constant term to reflect
civil lawsuits or fines imposed by regulatory authorities);
Dummy variables for the types of environmental harm (i.e., the medium
involved);
Dummy variables for the type of payment, including fines paid to state or
federal government authorities, payments that are designated for cleanup
costs, and combinations of payments (leaving the constant term to reflect civil
payments to private parties); and
A dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm also was subject to an
enforced cleanup or compliance cost.

The coefficient for the log of the market value of firm equity is positive (0.99),
although not significantly different from zero. This result is inconsistent with
conjectures that larger firms receive relatively small penalties for environmental
violations. The coefficient for criminal lawsuits is 7.50, and also is not significantly
different from zero. This result indicates that, in our sample, criminal charges are not
associated with higher legal penalties than those imposed through civil lawsuits or
regulatory sanctions. Thus, while the criminalization of environmental violations has
increased the potential for high penalties, criminal cases in practice are not associated
with unusually high penalties.
Most of the other coefficients in the regression also are statistically insignificant. In
particular, the penalty amount is not significantly related to the medium involved or the
payment type. The one statistically significant coefficient is for the dummy variable
indicating that the case was initiated by individuals or through class-action lawsuits.
This suggests that such lawsuits are associated with relatively large legal penalties.
Even this result, however, should be interpreted with caution in light of the regression’s
poor fit. The adjusted R2 is 0.073, and the F-statistic is 1.38. We cannot reject at the 10%
level the null hypothesis that all coefficients are zero.
In the second regression reported in Table 3, the dependent variable is the amount
of the compliance or cleanup cost. The results are similar to those in the first regression.
Compliance or cleanup costs are not significantly related to firm size, the medium
involved, or the payment type. The coefficient for actions brought by individuals is
positive, and the coefficient for cases in which the firm is assigned liability for a cleanup
cost is negative. Again, however, the F-statistic of 1.24 indicates that the model fit is
very poor.
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To check the robustness of these results, we estimated several different models
seeking to explain the cross-sectional variation in the penalty amounts, including
variables that control for the year of action and interaction effects involving the action
type, the party initiating the action, and the type of environmental harm. All of the
results are similar to those reported in Table 3. Neither the fines or damage awards, nor
the compliance and cleanup costs, are systematically related to characteristics of the
defendant firm or the nature of the violation.
Our inability to explain much of the cross-sectional variation in legal penalties is
consistent with the results of research into the predictability of legal penalties for firms
that are charged with other types of illegal behavior. Karpoff and Lott (1998), for
example, find that punitive damage awards are not systematically related to the
characteristics of the damage, consistent with arguments that punitive awards
frequently are arbitrary and not easily predicted. Like punitive damage awards, the
penalties imposed for environmental violations also are difficult to explain. Thus, our
results are consistent with arguments that environmental penalties are highly variable,
with large idiosyncratic and perhaps arbitrary components.
C. The Relation between Fines and Cleanup Costs
In a small subset of our sample, involving 15 cases, we have information that both
fines (or damage awards) and cleanup costs were imposed on defendant companies.
This small subsample provides an opportunity to examine whether fines and cleanup
costs are related. Table 4 reports the results of three regressions using data from these
cases. In each regression, the dependent variable is the fine or damage award amount.
Model 1 in Table 4 suggests that the fine is weakly but positively related to the
cleanup cost: the coefficient is 0.0253 with a t-statistic of 1.52. Cleanup costs provide one
measure of the cost of the environmental damage that results from the violation, so
these results suggest that penalties are positively related to the environmental harm.
The coefficient on firm size is negative with a t-statistic of -1.91. This provides some
evidence that penalties are negatively related to firm size, consistent with charges that
large firms pay small penalties.
The results in Model 1 are the strongest evidence we have that fines are somewhat
predictable. The adjusted R2 indicates that 23.2% of the cross-sectional variation in
penalties can be explained by firm size and the cleanup cost. However, as illustrated in
Models 2 and 3 in Table 4, these results are not robust. In Model 2, we include as a
regressor the square of the cleanup cost, as a control for any non-linear relation between
fines and cleanup costs. Both the cleanup cost and its square are insignificantly related
to the fine amount, and the regression’s F-statistic has a p-value of .18. In Model 3, we
also include dummy variables that reflect the type of environmental harm and the party
bringing the action. Here, the coefficients on firm size and cleanup costs both are
statistically insignificant. The only significant coefficient is, again, for the dummy
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variable indicating that the action was brought by individuals or through a class action
lawsuit. Overall, these results do not provide much support for the proposition that
fines are systematically related to characteristics of the violation or the size of the firm
committing it.
V. The Market Value Effects of Announcements of Environmental Violations
A. Average Abnormal Returns, by Announcement and Media Types
The results in Tables 2 - 4 indicate that the legal penalties for environmental
violations are substantial but not systematically related to the characteristics of the
violation. In this section we investigate the effects on share values when news about
actual or potential violations is first announced. In 60 of our cases, the initial press
report indicates that an environmental violation may have occurred. We label these
“allegation announcements.” In 80 cases, the initial press report indicates that charges
have been filed against the defendant company. And in 143 cases, the initial press report
indicates a settlement of the case. Settlements include agreements between the
defendant firm and the initiating party, consent orders, trial outcomes, and
announcements of fines by regulators.
Table 5 reports on the average two-day abnormal stock returns for the initial press
announcements of environmental violations for all 283 cases and for each
announcement type. The two-day event window consists of the day before plus the day
of the initial press report. Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between the
actual two-day return minus a forecast return from a one-factor market model. We
estimate the market model using trading days -230 through -31 relative to the initial
press date, and measure market returns using the CRSP equal-weighted index with
dividends. Test statistics are calculated using the procedure discussed by Mikkelson
and Partch (1988), which avoids a bias from errors in the estimation of the market
model parameters (see Salinger (1992)).
For all 283 initial press announcements, the average two-day abnormal stock return
is
-0.85%, with a t-statistic of -3.40. Thus, on average, the initial press report of a possible
or actual environmental violation is associated with a significant decrease in the
defendant company’s share value. The share price effect, however, depends on the type
of information contained in the initial announcement. For allegation announcements,
the mean abnormal stock return is -1.58% with a t-statistic of -2.32. For announcements
indicating that charges have been filed, the mean abnormal stock return is -1.92% with a
t-statistic of -3.25. For settlement announcements, however, the mean abnormal stock
return is 0.06% and is not significantly different from zero.
Our result regarding settlement announcements is similar to those reported by
Karpoff and Lott (1993, 1998) for criminal frauds and punitive damage awards. Like us,
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Karpoff and Lott find that initial announcements of settlements are associated with
statistically insignificant stock price reactions. We interpret this result as consistent with
the conjecture that an initial announcement about a settlement is not the first news of
the violation to reach financial markets. Instead, the settlement announcement is likely
to contain new information primarily about the outcome of a previously known
investigation or charge. Hence, the data indicate that, on average, investors form
unbiased expectations about the nature of the outcomes of environmental violations.13
Initial press reports about allegations or charges filed, however, are associated with
a statistically significant negative average abnormal return. Furthermore, the average
abnormal return is negative for all types of media involved. Among allegation
announcements, the largest average stock price drop is for 15 cases involving
contaminated sites.14 Among charges filed announcements, the largest average stock
price drops involve surface water and drinking water violations, as well as the 13
miscellaneous cases. Perhaps because the sample sizes in the individual cells are fairly
small, however, the differences in average abnormal returns across different media
types are not statistically significant.
For 53 cases, other potentially confounding news about the defendant company
was announced in The Wall Street Journal the day before, the day of, or the day after the
initial press announcement about the environmental violation. Many of these are
routine announcements regarding dividends or earnings reports. Others involve nonroutine announcements regarding asset sales or potential takeover rumors. Omitting
these 53 events from the sample, the average abnormal return becomes more negative.
For allegation announcements, it becomes -1.73% (t = -2.22), for charges filed
announcements, -2.25% (t = -3.41), for settlement announcements, -0.05% (t = -0.19), and
for all announcement types together, -1.10% (t = -3.67).
For 64 of the 283 cases in our sample, we identified a subsequent article in The Wall
Street Journal with additional information about the matter. The average abnormal twoday stock return for these 64 announcements is -0.37% with a t-statistic of 0.84. Thus,
unlike the initial announcements, these 64 secondary announcements are not associated
with statistically significant share value effects. This suggests that the abnormal return
upon the initial announcement is an unbiased estimate of the longer-term impact of the
violation on the firm’s market value.
13

In two cases, the settlement announcement revealed that any pending charges against the defendant
company had been dropped. We replicated all tests after omitting these cases, but the results are
qualitatively identical to those reported here.
14
This average is influenced by an outlier. On August 7, 1985, Louisiana state officials announced the
pending closure of a commercial waste facility operated by Rollins Environmental Services, in response
to problems including air emissions and possible groundwater contamination. The two-day abnormal
return for Rollins Environmental Services is -31%. Omitting this case does not affect the overall results
materially. For example, the mean abnormal return for the remaining 282 cases is -0.74% with a t-statistic
of 3.22.
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B. Determinants of the Cross-Section of Abnormal Returns
The results in Table 5 indicate that announcements of allegations and charges filed
are associated with statistically significant stock price declines. In this section we
examine whether the stock price reactions are associated with other characteristics of
the announcement, the violation, or the defendant company. Table 6 reports the results
of ordinary least squares regressions in which the dependent variable is the firm’s twoday abnormal stock return divided by its standard error. The independent variables
include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Firm size, measured as the natural log of the market value of equity ten
calendar days before the press announcement;
A dummy variable for allegation announcements;
A dummy variable for charges filed announcements;
Dummy variables for the types of environmental harm;
Dummy variables for the initiator of the action;
Dummy variables for the type of action;
A dummy variable set equal to one if we have information on the actual or
potential fines, damages, compliance, or cleanup costs imposed on the
company; and
The total dollar amount of the actual or potential fines, damages, compliance,
or remediation costs imposed on the company, divided by the market value of
the firm’s equity (this variable is zero for firms for which we do not have
penalty data).

The results are reported as Model 1 in Table 6. The coefficient on firm size is
positive and statistically significant, indicating that, in percentage terms, the market
value loss is a decreasing fraction of firm size. This finding is consistent with our earlier
finding that the absolute size of the legal penalty imposed is not related to the size of
the defendant firm. The coefficients for allegation and charges filed announcements are
significantly negative, consistent with our findings in Table 5 that the negative average
abnormal returns concentrate among these types of announcements. None of the
coefficients on any of the dummy variables representing the type of environmental
harm are statistically significant. This also is consistent with the results, reported above,
that the differences in average abnormal returns across the different media involved are
not statistically significant.
The coefficient on the dummy variable for actions initiated by state and local
agencies is negative, with a t-statistic of -2.32. This indicates that such actions are
associated with significantly more negative share value changes than actions initiated
by the EPA or Department of Justice. Among the type of action dummy variables, the
only one with a p-value less than .05 is for product recalls. The coefficient for
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assignments of liability also is negative, and is significant at the 10% level. Product
recalls in response to environment violations and assignments of liability for
environmental violations both have direct impacts on firms’ cash flows. These results
suggest that such actions have larger impacts on share value than do regulatory fines or
the prospect of loss from lawsuits over environmental damages.
Nevertheless, when monetary penalties or damage awards are assessed, there is
statistically weak evidence that they affect share values. The dummy variable
representing whether such monetary penalties are assessed is negative, although not
statistically significant (t-statistic = -1.27). The variable representing the size of the actual
or prospective penalty assessed also is negative, with a p-value of .11 (t-statistic = -1.60).
These results, although statistically insignificant, suggest that share values are affected
by the size of the monetary penalties firms pay for environmental harms.
To examine the effects of monetary penalties more closely, we decomposed the
penalty variables into four groups: fines and damage awards assessed, compliance and
cleanup costs, potential fines and damage awards, and potential compliance and
cleanup costs. For each group, we define a dummy variable that equals one when we
have data for that type of penalty. We also define a second variable that equals the
dollar amount of the penalty (or potential penalty). This has the effect of partitioning
the two monetary variables into eight variables.
The results from including these eight variables are reported as Model 2 in Table 6.
None of the new variables is statistically significant at the 10% or even 20% level. Thus,
we find no evidence to support the notion that the type of actual or potential monetary
penalties has a significant impact on share values.
VI. Estimates of Reputational Costs for nvironmental Violations
Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) and Mitchell and Maloney (1989) demonstrate that
reputational losses frequently impose large costs on firms that produce poor quality
products. In their examination of firms committing criminal frauds, Karpoff and Lott
(1993) find that the market value losses were far greater than any criminal fines,
restitution, or other court-imposed penalties. They attribute the difference largely to
reputational losses, which consist of the value of lost revenues or higher input costs
arising from the frauds.
In this section we examine the reputational costs imposed on firms committing
environmental violations. To do so, we compare the firms’ market value losses with
their legal penalties. To control for firm size effects, we divide both the market value
loss and the legal penalty by the market value of the firm’s equity. Because settlement
announcements appear to yield little new information to financial markets, on average,
we focus on allegation and charges filed announcements. In our sample, there are 35
such cases in which we also have information about actual legal penalties assessed, and
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an additional 42 cases in which the press announcement contains information about
potential penalties.
Panel A of Table 7 compares the mean abnormal stock return for these 77 cases with
the legal penalty. Overall, the mean abnormal stock return for these 77 cases is -2.11%.
The mean value of the actual or potential legal penalty, in contrast, is 36.68% of the
market value of equity. (The t-statistic for the difference in means is 1.60.) Thus, the
legal penalty, on average, far outweighs the market value loss.
Among these 77 cases, however, are five for which the actual or legal penalty far
outweighs the market value of equity. Four of these cases involve prospective damage
awards in civil lawsuits or potential liability for an expensive cleanup.15 It is reasonable
to presume that the potential costs projected in news articles were overstated and
known to be so. Panel B of Table 7 therefore reports on mean abnormal returns and
legal costs excluding these five cases from the sample. Even excluding these cases,
however, the mean legal penalty still is greater in magnitude (2.85% of firm value) than
the abnormal stock return (-2.05%). (The t-statistic for the difference in means is 0.71.)
The results in Panel B may still be biased because they include cases in which the
legal penalty is computed as its potential amount forecast at the time of the initial press
announcement. In Panel C, we include data only from cases in which the actual legal
penalty is reported. In 24 of these cases, the actual legal penalty was reported after the
initial press announcement date. Assuming that investors have rational expectations
about legal penalties, however, the actual penalties are reasonable measures of their
expected amounts at the times of the initial press announcements.
Using this smaller sample, the average legal penalty is 1.70% of the market value of
firm equity. The corresponding mean abnormal return is -1.55%. (The t-statistic for the
difference in means is 0.16.) Thus, even in this smaller sample, the average abnormal
return is not significantly larger than the average legal penalty.
In addition to any legal penalties that we measure, firms typically must pay
attorneys’ fees and court costs, and may suffer lost profits from foregoing the activity
that violated environmental regulations. It therefore is reasonable to presume that our
measure of the legal penalty actually understates a firm’s total explicit costs from
charges of an environmental violation. Even with such understatement, the data
indicate that the explicit costs imposed through legal procedures are no less than the
average firm’s loss in share value. There is no share value loss that confidently can be
attributed to lost future revenues or higher expected operating costs because of
15

These cases include: (i) the announcement of a $1.8 billion lawsuit seeking damages from Charter Co.
for dioxin poisoning; (ii) a $100 million lawsuit seeking damages from RSR Corp. for pollution at its
Texas recycling plant; (iii) a $225 million lawsuit seeking damages from SCA Services for pollution from
improper storage of industrial wastes, and (iv) Gulf Resources and Chemical Corp.’s possible liability for
a $100 million cleanup of a Superfund site. The fifth case is Union Carbide’s Bhopal disaster, which
resulted in a $350 million settlement.
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reputational issues. Thus, these results indicate that the average reputational penalty for
environmental violations is negligible. Unlike criminal frauds and product recalls, it
appears that reputational costs do little, on average, to discourage environmental
violations.16
VI. Conclusions
This paper provides empirical evidence on the legal penalties and market value
losses experienced by companies that violate environmental regulations. The evidence
addresses controversies over the sizes and predictability of the legal penalties, and over
the importance of reputational costs for environmental violations. Using data initially
from 77 events in which firms were investigated, convicted, or cited for environmental
violations, we find that fines and damage awards are substantial, averaging $9.43 in our
sample. Enforced compliance and cleanup costs are even larger, averaging $59.97
million among the 55 events in our sample in which such costs were imposed. These
legal penalties are not significantly related to the size of the defendant company,
contrary to arguments that large firms receive relatively small legal sanctions for
environmental harms. Criminal penalties also are not higher than civil penalties. There
is some evidence that actions initiated by individuals, including class-action lawsuits,
are associated with relatively high penalties, primarily because these include civil
lawsuits that seek punitive damage awards. Overall, however, we are unable to explain
much variation in the legal penalties using information on the type of environmental
harm, the party that initiates the action, or whether the penalty consists of criminal,
civil, or cleanup payments. The poor fit of our models that seek to explain crosssectional variation in legal penalties is consistent with arguments that such penalties are
highly variable and not easily predicted.
Using data from a broader sample of 283 cases, we find that firms investigated or
charged with environmental violations experience statistically significant and
economically meaningful decreases in common share values. For announcements of
alleged environmental violations, the average abnormal stock return is –1.58% with a tstatistic of 2.32. For announcements that charges had been filed against the firm, the
average abnormal stock return is –1.92 with a t-statistic of 3.25. (Initial press
announcements that a firm settled allegations of violations, in contrast, are associated
with negligible and statistically insignificant average abnormal stock returns.) Share
value losses are negatively related to firm size, and are relatively high for violations that
lead to product recalls or assignment of liability for an environmental harm. Such losses
also are higher, on average, for actions brought by state and local authorities than for
16

An alternative but not mutually exclusive interpretation is that, on average, the social cost of these
violations is small. If this is the case, the reputational penalty is negligible and legal penalties are
suboptimally high.
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actions brought by the EPA or Department of Justice. One interpretation of this result is
that enforcement actions by local governments effectively impose significant costs on
defendant companies.
Finally, we find that firms’ share value losses are of similar magnitude to their legal
penalties. This implies that the share value losses can be completely attributed to the
legal penalties rather than to expectations of lower profits due to reputational losses.
The reputational penalty for violating environmental regulations is negligible, on
average. This result supports arguments that environmental violations are unlike
frauds, product recalls, or punitive damage lawsuits, all of which have been found to
impose substantial reputational penalties on the offending firms. Using Becker’s (1968)
optimal penalties framework, this supports the view that optimal legal penalties should
be higher for environmental crimes than for such other illegal activities as criminal
fraud, which are efficiently disciplined by reputational effects.
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Table 1: Environmental Violations Sample
Distribution of 283 first-time announcements of environmental violations obtained from The Wall Street
Journal during the period 1980-1991. Panel A reports announcements by year and type of action initiated
by the plaintiff. Panel B reports announcements by the type of environmental harm involved in the
dispute. Panel C reports announcements by the party bringing the action.
Panel A: Type of Action

Year

Criminal
Suit

Civil
Suit

Regulatory
Fine/Action

Consent
Order

Product
Recall

Liability
Assignment

Total

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

1
2
1
2
1
1
1
2
3
1
1
3

17
11
5
8
4
5
7
10
6
8
8
12

7
3
5
9
7
15
9
6
7
4
9
10

2
2
0
2
0
1
3
1
1
1
2
4

7
0
2
4
4
5
6
2
2
3
0
0

0
3
0
0
3
4
1
0
0
2
3
2

34
21
13
25
19
31
27
21
19
19
23
31

Total

19

101

91

19

35

18

283

Panel B: Type of Environmental Harm

All years

Air

Surface
Water

Drinking
Water

Contaminated
Site

Multiple
Media

92

58

11

79

13

Miscellaneous
Media
Total
30

283

Panel C: Party Bringing Action

All years

State/Local
Agency

EPA

Justice
Dept

Environmental
Group

Individuals

Total

58

143

46

7

29

283
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Table 2: Sizes of the Legal Penalties Levied for Environmental Violations
Panel A provides summary information on the actual fines or damage awards assessed against in 77
environmental violations, categorized by the type of environmental harm. Panel B reports on the
compliance or cleanup costs imposed in 55 cases of environmental violations. The data are drawn from
our sample of 283 environmental violations obtained from The Wall Street Journal Index during the period
1980-1991. In some cases, we have information only on estimates of the potential legal penalties that
could be imposed. Panel C reports on the estimated potential fines and damage awards in 51 additional
environmental violations, and Panel D reports on the estimated potential compliance or cleanup costs in
11 additional cases. Amounts are in millions of dollars.
Type of environmental harm

Air

Surface
Water

Drinking
Water

Contaminated
Site

Multiple
Media

Miscellaneous
Media

Total

0.48
0.48
1

3.36
1.73
20

12.30
12.30
2

1.05
0.45
11

9.43
0.60
77

38.53
2.90
3

75.71
11.00
24

99.38
103.75
4

33.48
0.33
3

59.97
8.00
55

156.54
5.68
14

136.00
136.00
1

0.86
0.90
8

82.67
2.10
51

373.05
98.75
10

---

---

352.77
100.00
11

Panel A: Actual Fines and Damage Awards
Mean
Median
Obs.

28.10
0.60
21

1.45
0.55
22

Panel B: Actual Compliance and Cleanup Costs
Mean
Median
Obs.

77.77
8.00
9

13.97
1.25
12

Panel C: Estimated Potential Fines and Damage Awards
Mean
Median
Obs.

84.48
7.75
12

53.40
1.00
13

57.90
35.00
3

Panel D: Estimated Potential Compliance and Cleanup Costs
Mean
Median
Obs.

150.00
150.00
1

---

---

24

Table 3: Determinants of the Fines and Cleanup Costs Imposed for Environmental Violations
Ordinary least squares estimates of the relations between the legal penalties imposed on firms
committing environmental violations, and characteristics of the violations. The dependent variable in the
first regression is the dollar amount of the fine or damage award imposed. The dependent variable in the
second regression is the dollar amount of the compliance or cleanup costs imposed on the firm. All
coefficients are in millions. t-statistics are in parentheses.
Dependent variable
Fine or damage

Compliance or
award imposed

cleanup cost imposed

0.99
(0.32)

23.94
(1.14)

Action brought by state agency

1.05
(0.07)

-67.19
(-1.19)

Action brought by environmental group

2.65
(0.08)

24.38
(0.14)

Action brought by individuals

62.04

Market value of equity (natural log)
Dummy variables for party bringing action:

(including class action lawsuits)

(2.97)

307.22
c

c
(3.16)

Dummy variables for action type:
Criminal lawsuit

7.50
(0.47)

41.77
(0.41)

Consent order

16.81
(1.00)

16.75
(0.25)

Assignment of cleanup liability

-3.02
(-0.09)

-212.39
(-2.52)

a

Dependent variable
Fine or damage
Compliance or
award imposed
cleanup cost imposed

Dummy variables for type of environmental harm:
Air emission violations

11.75
(0.72)

41.91
(0.26)

Surface water violations

-10.57
(-0.62)

-37.53
(-0.22)

Drinking water contamination

-71.99

-43.27

25

(-1.52)

(-0.23)

0.71
(0.04)

50.14
(0.32)

-15.75
(-0.46)

-34.40
(-0.18)

Payment made to a state or federal
government agency

-12.68
(-0.96)

-32.98
(-0.16)

Amount paid is designated for cleanup

-14.89
(-0.43)

27.23
(0.15)

Amount is a combination of fines, damage
awards, and/or cleanup costs

-9.59
(-0.38)

51.03
(0.26)

Contaminated site (including CERCLA
and subsurface water violations)
Violations of multiple media

Dummy variables for type of payment:

Dummy variable equal to 1 if compliance
or cleanup cost also is imposed

-0.96
(-0.04)

Dummy variable equal to 1 if a fine or damage
award also is imposed

-34.15
(-0.47)

Intercept

-5.01
(-0.10)

F-value
p-value
2
Adjusted R
Number of cases
a,b,c

-321.53
(-0.96)

1.38
[0.185]

1.24
[0.288]

0.073

0.065

77

55

denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test.
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Table 4: Determinants of Fines when Cleanup Costs Are also Imposed
Ordinary least squares estimates of the relations between the fines imposed on firms committing
environmental violations, and characteristics of the violations. This table reports results based on the 14
cases in the sample for which the firm paid both a fine and a cleanup cost. The dependent variable is the
dollar amount of the fine or damage award imposed. t-statistics are in parentheses.
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

-2.80
(-1.91)a

-2.77
(-1.82)a

-1.14
(-0.57)

2.53
(1.52)

5.73
(0.08)

-1.98
(-0.32)

5.07
(0.29)

0.11
(0.76)

Ln of the market value of equity (x 107)

Clean-up cost paid by company
(x 102)
Square of the clean-up cost
paid by company (x 10-11)
Dummy variables for type of environmental harm:
Air emission violations (x 107)

1.67
(0.25)

Surface water violations (x 107)

-2.12
(-0.38)

Contaminated site, including CERCLA
and subsurface water violations (x 107)

2.54
(0.41)

Dummy variables for party initiating action:
Action brought by state agency (x 107)

--0.33
(-0.07)

Action brought by individuals (x 107)
(including class action lawsuits)

19.57
(2.48)b

Intercept

F-value
p-value
Adjusted R2

a,b,c

0.20
(0.04)
3.11
[0.082]
0.232

1.94
[0.181]
0.346

36.68
[0.000]
0.942

denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test.
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Table 5: Abnormal Stock Returns Associated with Announcements of Environmental Violations
Average two-day cumulative abnormal returns -1,0 for 283 first-time announcements of environmental
violations obtained from The Wall Street Journal Index during the period 1980-1991, categorized by the
type of environmental harm and the announcement type. The table reports the mean, median, t-statistic
and the number of announcements in each category.
Type of Environmental Harm
Announcement Type
Allegation

Air

Surface
Water

Drinking
Water

Contaminate
d Site

Multipl
e Media

Miscellaneous
Media

Total

mean

-1.44

-0.08

0.24

-4.17

-0.93

-0.11

-1.58

median

-0.91

0.36

0.24

-0.98

-0.49

0.42

-0.57

a

-0.12

--

a

-0.69

0.09

18

13

1

15

5

8

60

mean

-1.13

-2.29

-2.36

-1.74

--

-2.36

-1.92

median

-0.70

-0.74

-1.08

-1.51

--

0.43

-0.96

t-statistic

-1.26

c

--

0.87

no. of obs.

15

20

7

25

0

13

80

mean

-0.03

0.38

-0.12

-0.07

-0.40

0.71

0.06

median

-0.18

0.84

0.61

-0.07

0.38

-0.06

0.12

t-statistic

-0.09

0.58

-0.16

-0.17

-0.49

-1.04

0.27

no. of obs.

59

25

3

39

8

9

143

mean

-0.48

-0.65

-1.51

-1.38

-0.60

-0.84

-0.85

median

-0.57

0.18

-0.17

-0.41

-0.39

0.31

-0.39

t-statistic

-1.60

-1.14

c

-0.87

-0.69

no. of obs.

92

58

13

30

t-statistic
no. of obs.
Charges Filed

Settlement

All Announcement Types

a,b,

-1.87

-1.76

a

-1.83

-1.70
11

-1.80

a

a

-3.11

-2.60
79

c indicate statistical significance using a two-tailed test at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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-2.32

b

-3.25

-3.40
283

c

c

Table 6: Determinants of the Firms’ Announcement Period Abnormal Returns
Ordinary least squares estimates of the relations between abnormal returns associated with initial Wall
Street Journal announcements of environmental violations, and characteristics of the announcement and
the defendant company. The dependent variable is the two-day announcement period abnormal stock
return divided by its standard error. Independent variables include the natural log of the market value of
firm equity, dummy variables for the announcement type, the identity of the party initiating the action,
the action type, and the type of environmental harm, plus variables that represent the cost of any legal
sanctions imposed. All coefficients are in percent (i.e., multiplied by 100). t-statistics are in parentheses.

Variable
Market value of equity (natural log)
Dummy variables for announcement type:
Allegation announcements

Model 1

Model 2

2.42

2.03

c
(2.78)

b
(2.18)

-11.41

Charges filed announcements

(-1.89)

-9.11

-6.49

(-2.27)
Dummy variables for party bringing action:
Action brought by state agency

-8.99

c
(-2.65)

b

-8.73
(-2.32)

a

(-1.33)
-9.00

b

(-2.33)

b

Action brought by environmental group

-8.88
(-0.93)

-9.31
(-0.96)

Action brought by individuals
(including class action lawsuits)

-1.22
(-0.23)

1.00
(0.18)

2.14
(0.33)

0.20
(0.03)

-4.97
(-1.16)

-3.96
(-0.87)

0.21
(0.03)

1.66
(0.25)

Dummy variables for action type:
Criminal lawsuit

Civil lawsuit

Consent order

Product recall

-15.20
(-2.30)

Assignment of (clean-up) liability

-11.92
b

-11.27
(-1.69)

Dummy variables for type of environmental harm:
Air emission violations

a

-11.42
a

1.67
(0.30)
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(-1.71

(-1.61)

1.21
(0.21)

Surface water violations

1.70
(0.31)

Drinking water contamination

-13.85
(-1.69)

Contaminated site (including CERCLA
and subsurface water violations)
Violations of multiple media

1.93
(0.34)
-14.81

a

(-1.75)

0.05
(0.01)

-0.51
(-0.09)

-1.66
(-0.21)

-3.91
(-0.47)

Variables for the type and cost of the legal penalty imposed:
Dummy variable equal to 1 when legal penalty
information is available

-4.20
(-1.27)

Dollar amount of the legal penalty divided by
the market value of equity

-1.75
(-1.60)

a

Dummy variable equal to 1 when fine or damage award
information is available

3.55
(0.64)

Dollar amount of the fine or damage award divided by
the market value of equity

-0.05
(-0.58)

Dummy variable equal to 1 when compliance or
cleanup cost information is available

4.25
(0.63)

Dollar amount of the compliance or cleanup cost
divided by the market value of equity

0.02
(0.48)

Dummy variable equal to 1 when potential fine
or damage award information is available

-1.08
(-0.17)

Dollar amount of the potential fine or damage award
divided by the market value of equity

-0.00
(-1.10)

Dummy variable equal to 1 when potential compliance
or cleanup cost information is available

0.51
(0.51)

Dollar amount of the potential compliance or cleanup
cost divided by the market value of equity

-0.02
(-1.23)

Intercept

-26.83

--23.23
a

F-value
p-value
2
Adjusted R
a, b,c

(-1.83)
2.42
[0.001]

(-1.48)
1.79
[0.011]

0.085

0.074

denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test.
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Table 7: Comparisons of Firms’ Market Value Losses to the Legal Penalties Imposed
Comparisons of the average abnormal stock return to the size of the actual or prospective legal penalty
imposed on firms alleged to commit or charged with environmental violations, 1980 - 1991. Events for
which the initial press announcement is of a settlement are excluded. Panel A includes data from all 77
events for which actual or prospective legal penalty data are available. Panel B excludes five events for
which the prospective legal penalties are extremely large outlier amounts. Panel C includes only events
for which the actual legal penalty is known.
Type of Environmental Harm
Air

Surface
Water

Drinking
Water

Contaminate
d Site

Multipl
e Media

Miscellaneous
Media

Total

Mean % loss in market value

1.81

1.42

4.19

2.48

-3.24

2.49

2.11

Mean legal penalty (% of market
value)

47.80

1.08

4.60

58.12

0.03

0.14

38.68

17

17

4

26

1

12

77

Panel A: All observations

Number of observations

Panel B: Excluding five cases with extremely high prospective legal penalties
Mean % loss in market value

1.74

1.42

4.19

2.35

-3.24

2.49

2.05

Mean legal penalty (% of market
value)

1.95

1.08

4.84

5.94

0.03

0.14

2.85

15

17

4

23

1

12

72

Number of observations

Panel C: Only cases with known legal penalties (i.e., excluding all cases with prospective legal penalties)
Mean % loss in market value

3.22

1.17

3.54

1.58

-3.24

-0.37

1.55

Mean legal penalty (% of market
value)

1.96

0.26

1.88

3.63

0.03

0.30

1.70

7

7

3

10

1

5

35

Number of observations
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